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CHARACTER, RELIABILITY, AND VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY
By Jason Baehr
Loyola Marymount University

The field of virtue epistemology is routinely characterized as the epistemological analog
of virtue ethics. While there are indeed obvious similarities between the two fields, there is also
an important dissimilarity. Virtue ethicists generally agree about the basic structure and
paradigm cases of moral virtue. They think of moral virtues as acquired excellences of (moral)
character like generosity, courage, honesty, and temperance. Virtue epistemologists, on the other
hand, are divided about the nature of an intellectual virtue. “Virtue responsibilists” conceive of
intellectual virtues as the intellectual counterpart to moral virtues. These include traits like fairmindedness, open-mindedness, intellectual carefulness, intellectual courage, and the like. “Virtue
reliabilists” conceive of intellectual virtues as any reliable or truth-conducive quality of a person.
They cite as paradigm cases of intellectual virtue certain cognitive faculties or abilities like
vision, memory, introspection, and reason.1
This disagreement has resulted in two rather disparate approaches to virtue epistemology,
as the proponents of each approach tend to focus exclusively on the qualities they regard as
intellectual virtues and to say little about the qualities that interest the other group. Virtue
reliabilists, for example, generally do not concern themselves with traits like open-mindedness or
The terms “virtue reliabilism” and “virtue responsibilism” originate (respectively) with Lorraine Code, “Toward a
Responsibilist Epistemology,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 45 (1984), pp. 29-50, and Guy Axtell,
“Recent Work in Virtue Epistemology,” American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (1997), pp. 1-27. For recent
overviews of the field, see: John Greco, “Virtue Epistemology,” in Edward Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2002/entries/epistemology-virtue/), and “Virtues in
Epistemology,” in Paul Moser (ed.), Oxford handbook of Epistemology (Oxford: OUP, 2002), pp. 287-315; and
Linda Zagzebski, “Virtue Epistemology,” in Edward Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (London:
Routledge, 1998), pp. 617-21.
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intellectual courage. And when they do, it is often just to point out that these qualities are not
very relevant to their preferred set of epistemological projects. Likewise, virtue responsibilists,
by limiting their interest to the character traits of a good knower, usually have little to say about
the epistemological significance of cognitive faculties like memory and vision.
My immediate concern here is virtue reliabilists’ neglect of responsibilist character
virtues. Much of the paper is devoted to showing that these traits satisfy virtue reliabilists’ formal
conditions for an intellectual virtue and that consequently virtue reliabilists must include these
traits in their repertoire of intellectual virtues. Indeed a failure to do so, I explain, leaves virtue
reliabilists unable to account for some of the most valued kinds or instances of knowledge. I also
explain how the same basic argument can be leveled against any reliabilist epistemology.
Toward the end of the paper, I examine the implications of the argument for the theoretical focus
of virtue reliabilism and reliabilism in general. I argue that it leads to new questions and
challenges that any reliabilist epistemology must address.
I
I begin by showing that virtue reliabilists are indeed committed to denying the
responsibilist’s character virtues the status of intellectual virtue.2 Alvin Goldman is one of the
originators and most able defenders of reliabilism. While it is not entirely clear that Goldman
should or even wishes to be classified as a virtue epistemologist, he sometimes aligns himself
with the movement. In “Epistemic Folkways and Scientific Epistemology,” for example, he
identifies “the concept of justified belief with the concept of belief obtained through the exercise
of intellectual virtues (excellences).” Goldman goes on to say that “the virtues include belief

I use the term “intellectual virtue” mainly (though not exclusively) in a quasi-technical way to refer to those traits
which, from a virtue reliabilist perspective, contribute logically to the justification or warrant component of
knowledge.
2
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formation based on sight, hearing, memory, reasoning in certain ‘approved’ ways, and so forth.”3
This suggests that Goldman is thinking of intellectual virtues at least primarily as certain
cognitive faculties or abilities, rather than as character traits.
This does not prove, however, that Goldman would exclude the relevant character traits
from a more exhaustive list of the virtues. But that he does intend such an exclusion seems clear
from passages like the following:
In the moral sphere ordinary language is rich in virtues terminology. By contrast there are
few common labels for intellectual virtues, and those that do exist – ‘perceptiveness’,
‘thoroughness’, ‘insightfulness’, and so forth – are of limited value in the present context.
I propose to identify the relevant intellectual virtues … with the belief-forming
capacities, faculties, or processes that would be accepted as answers to the question ‘How
does X know?’. In answer to this form of question, it is common to reply, ‘He saw it’, ‘He
heard it’, ‘He remembers it’, ‘He infers it from such-and-such evidence’, and so forth.
Thus, basing belief on seeing, hearing, memory, and (good) inference are in the
collection of what the folk regard as intellectual virtues.4
Here Goldman identifies certain intellectual character virtues (e.g., perceptiveness and
thoroughness) by name. But he seems to think that these traits – as opposed to cognitive faculties
like hearing and memory – are not really intellectual virtues at all and thus that a consideration of
them is not relevant to the project that most interests him and other reliabilists (i.e., the analysis
of knowledge).
John Greco is also a chief proponent of reliabilism and of virtue reliabilism in particular.
Like Goldman, Greco offers a definition of knowledge that gives a central role to intellectual
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Liaisons: Philosophy Meets the Cognitive and Social Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), pp. 157-58.
Ibid., p. 162.
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virtues conceived as reliable “abilities or powers” like perception, memory, and reason. He says
that “S has knowledge regarding p if and only if S believes the truth regarding p because S
believes p out of intellectual virtue.”5 But unlike Goldman, Greco says a good deal about the
epistemological role of intellectual character virtues. He does so in the context of considering
which of the two main conceptions of intellectual virtue (i.e., the reliabilist’s or the
responsibilist’s) is preferable. Greco claims that epistemologists appeal to virtue concepts in an
effort to deal with certain substantive philosophical problems (e.g., problems concerning the
nature of knowledge) and that whichever conception of intellectual virtue deals with these
problems most effectively is preferable.6 He goes on to argue that a character-model of
intellectual virtue is unhelpful for giving an account of the nature of knowledge. His reasoning is
that an analysis of knowledge aims to specify the necessary and sufficient conditions for
knowledge; however, because it is often possible to acquire knowledge absent an exercise of
intellectual character virtues, such an exercise cannot be necessary for knowledge.7 Greco
concludes that a responsibilist conception of intellectual virtue should be rejected on the grounds
that it is “too strong” to deal effectively with traditional epistemological problems like the
analysis of knowledge.8
Notice, however, that this by itself does not entail that character virtues are irrelevant to a
virtue reliabilist analysis of knowledge. Greco’s main claim is that intellectual virtues should not
be defined as traits of intellectual character. But this leaves open the possibility that the
intellectual character virtues might satisfy the virtue reliabilist’s more general or formal
“Virtues in Epistemology,” p. 311; his italics.
Ibid., p. 296.
7
Ibid., pp. 296-97. This includes various instances of perceptual, a priori, introspective, and memorial knowledge.
For an in-depth discussion of this point and its implications for virtue responsibilism, see Jason Baehr, “Character In
Epistemology,” in Philosophical Studies, forthcoming.
8
Ibid., p. 297. Greco does not, however, dismiss this conception as altogether irrelevant to epistemology, since he
thinks there are likely to be other, less traditional epistemological questions to which it might be relevant. See, e.g.,
pp. 297-98.
5
6
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conditions for an intellectual virtue, which in turn would entail, contrary to Greco’s apparent
suggestion, that character virtues are essential to a virtue reliabilist analysis of knowledge.
While a legitimate possibility, and one that will be explored in much greater detail below,
this is not something that Greco considers; nor would he seem very interested in doing so. This is
evident, first and most obviously, in the fact that he makes no mention of this possibility.
Greco’s discussion of character virtues certainly leaves the impression that he is thinking of these
traits as relevant, at best, only to less traditional and less mainstream epistemological projects. If
to the contrary he holds that character virtues can satisfy the conditions for intellectual virtue and
thus contribute to knowledge, we would expect him to be explicit about this. Second, intellectual
character virtues do not appear on any of Greco’s various “lists” of intellectual virtues; rather,
when citing examples of intellectual virtue, Greco refers exclusively to cognitive faculties or
capacities like vision, memory, reason, and the like.9 But again, if he thinks character virtues can
satisfy the conditions for an intellectual virtue, we would expect them to receive mention in this
context. Third, Greco clearly aligns himself with Sosa’s general account of intellectual virtue,
and he attributes to Sosa the view that intellectual virtues are “cognitive abilities rather than
character traits.”10 It seems clear, then, that Greco is committed to denying that character virtues
should be regarded as intellectual virtues in the sense relevant to a virtue reliabilist account of
knowledge.
Ernest Sosa is perhaps the most familiar and prolific advocate of virtue epistemology and
of virtue reliabilism in particular. He claims that a true belief is justified and is an instance of
knowledge only if it is produced or sustained by an exercise of intellectual virtue.11 Later on I

9

See, e.g., his Putting Skeptics In Their Place (Cambridge: CUP, 2000).
“Virtues in Epistemology,” p. 295; my italics.
11
Knowledge In Perspective (Cambridge: CUP, 1991), pp. 144, 239-42, and 289-90. As I note below, an additional
requirement for what Sosa calls “reflective” or “human” knowledge is that the person in question have an “epistemic
10
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consider how some of Sosa’s discussions of intellectual virtue support thinking of character
virtues as intellectual virtues in a reliabilist sense; but with regard to his own position on the
matter, there is good reason to think that he rejects this claim. First, Sosa regularly cites
examples of the traits he regards as intellectual virtues. And these examples, like Greco’s,
include the usual reliabilist faculty virtues and other similar traits – not any intellectual character
virtues. 12 Given Sosa’s extensive treatment of the structure and epistemological significance of
intellectual virtue, it would be very odd if he thought that character virtues qualified as
intellectual virtues and yet never mentioned or elaborated this point. Second, Sosa regularly uses
the terms “virtue” and “faculty” interchangeably.13 While it is natural to refer to capacities like
introspection, memory, and so forth, as cognitive “faculties,” it is much less natural to refer to
character traits like fair-mindedness and intellectual honesty in this way. A related point
concerns Sosa’s tendency to describe intellectual virtues as “input-output devices”14 and as
“truth-conducive belief-generating mechanisms.”15 While this seems like a fitting description of
faculty virtues, it is much less fitting as a description of character virtues. Character virtues do, in
some sense, give rise to or “generate” beliefs. But they do so in a way that hardly seems
mechanistic. An exercise of intellectual character virtues – as with moral virtues – involves a
person’s agency: to exercise a character virtue is, for example, to deliberate and to choose in
certain way. Thus beliefs that emerge from inquiry involving intellectual character virtues are
unlikely to have been produced in a very mechanical or input-output way. This further suggests
that Sosa is not thinking of character virtues as intellectual virtues in the relevant sense. Finally,
perspective” on the known belief, which consists of a coherent set of additional beliefs concerning the source and
reliability of the original belief (ibid., Chapter 11). Our concern here, however, lies with the virtue component of
Sosa’s analysis.
12
Ibid., Chapters 8, 13, and 16.
13
Ibid., pp. 138-39, 234-36, and 273-74.
14
Ibid., p. 227.
15
Ibid., p. 271.
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Sosa sometimes describes a true belief generated by an exercise of intellectual virtue as mere
“animal,” “servomechanic,” or “metaphorical” knowledge.16 But for similar reasons, this is
likely to be an obvious mischaracterization of a belief arrived at through an exercise of
intellectual character virtues. Again, reaching the truth via an exercise of character virtues makes
demands on a person qua agent. Consequently, the resulting knowledge is unlikely to amount to
“animal” or “servomechanic” knowledge at all. These considerations strongly suggest that Sosa
does not regard the character traits in question as intellectual virtues. And since the concept of an
intellectual virtue occupies the leading role in his account of knowledge, he also apparently
believes that matters of intellectual character do not have an important role to play in a reliabilist
analysis of knowledge.
II
Having shown that virtue reliabilists do not regard character virtues as intellectual virtues
of a sort relevant to a philosophical account of knowledge, my aim in this section is to
demonstrate that this is a mistake. I argue that character virtues sometimes satisfy virtue
reliabilists’ formal conditions for an intellectual virtue. This point, together with the fact that
virtue reliabilists generally view knowledge as (roughly) true belief arising from an exercise of
intellectual virtue, reveals that intellectual character virtues are indeed relevant to virtue
reliabilist accounts of knowledge. I also explain why a similar point holds for any reliabilist
account of knowledge.
Virtue reliabilists are committed to a formal conception of intellectual virtue according to
which intellectual virtues are personal qualities that, under certain conditions and with respect to

16

Ibid., pp. 240 and 275.
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certain propositions, are helpful for reaching the truth and avoiding error. 17 This general
characterization has been specified in numerous ways, but for the moment, I note just one.
According to virtue reliabilists, a personal quality is an intellectual virtue only if it plays a
critical or salient role in getting a person to the truth, only if it best explains why a person
reaches the truth.18 Thus a personal quality is not an intellectual virtue if it tends to play only a
minor or supporting role in reaching the truth.
This characterization reveals that virtue reliabilists do not make a principled exclusion of
intellectual character virtues from their repertoire of intellectual virtues. There is nothing in their
formal definitions of an intellectual virtue that would prevent character virtues from qualifying
as intellectual virtues in the relevant sense. Nevertheless, when they go on to develop their
accounts of intellectual virtue and its role in knowledge, they tend to focus exclusively on
cognitive faculties and abilities, giving little or no attention to any character virtues.
Is this neglect of intellectual character virtues warranted? Or do intellectual character
virtues sometimes play a critical or salient role in reaching the truth? This depends largely on the
subject matter in question. With regard to many propositions or kinds of propositions, reaching
the truth is a rather simple and straightforward affair. Reaching the truth about the appearance of
one’s immediate surroundings, for instance, typically requires only that one’s visual faculty be in
good working order. A similar point could be made about several instances of introspective,
memorial, and a priori propositions, for example, that one has a headache, that one drove to
work, or that two plus three equals five. It may be that if one were entirely uninterested in the
truth about these matters, or desired for some reason to avoid the truth, the proper functioning of
See, for example: Goldman, op. cit., pp. 157-63; Sosa, ibid., pp. 138, 225, 242, and 284; and Greco, “Virtues In
Epistemology,” pp. 287 and 302. For simplicity, I will mostly ignore the end of avoiding error and will focus instead
on that of reaching the truth. However, similar points apply to the former end.
18
See, e.g., Greco, “Knowledge as Credit for True Belief,” in Michael DePaul and Linda Zagzebski (eds.),
Intellectual Virtue (Oxford: OUP, 2003), pp. 155-79.
17
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one’s cognitive faculties would be insufficient for reaching the truth. In most cases of this sort,
however, what fundamentally explains or causes one to reach the truth is not an attitude or state
of character, but rather the proper functioning of one’s basic cognitive endowment. Thus if we
limit our attention (as most contemporary epistemologists do) to the sorts of ordinary and
mundane truths just noted, it seems that intellectual character virtues do not satisfy the virtue
reliabilist’s conditions for an intellectual virtue.
But of course reaching the truth is not always so easy. This is so especially with regard to
the domains of human knowledge that humans tend to value most. Getting to the truth about
historical, scientific, moral, philosophical, psychological, or religious matters, for instance, can
make significant agency-related demands: it can require considerable concentration, patience,
reflection, honesty; it can require the possession of certain intentions, beliefs, and desires. While
reaching the truth in these areas does typically require that our cognitive faculties be in good
working order, this is not usually what explains or at least what best explains our actually getting
to the truth. Rather, reaching the truth in these areas is often explained largely or most saliently
in terms of an exercise of certain traits of intellectual character: traits like intellectual
carefulness, thoroughness, tenacity, adaptability, creativity, circumspection, attentiveness,
patience, and honesty.
Consider some examples:

(1) A field biologist is trying to explain a change in the migration patterns of a certain
endangered bird species. Collecting and analyzing the relevant data is tedious work and
requires a special eye for detail. The biologist is committed to discovering the truth and
so spends long hours in the field gathering data. He remains focused and determined in

9

the face of various obstacles and distractions (e.g., conflicting evidence, bureaucratic
road blocks, inclement weather conditions, boredom, etc.). He picks up on important
details in environmental reports and makes keen discriminations regarding the
composition and trajectory of several observed flocks. As a result of his determination
and careful and insightful methods of inquiry, he discovers why the birds have altered
their course.

(2) An investigative reporter is researching a story on corporate crime and begins to
uncover evidence indicating that some of the perpetrators are executives in the very
corporation that owns his newspaper. The reporter believes that he and his readership
have a right to know about the relevant crimes, so he persists with the investigation,
recognizing that it may cost him his job and perhaps more. Undaunted even by personal
threats, the reporter proceeds with his investigation and after several months of rigorous
intellectual labor uncovers and exposes the executives’ misdeeds.

(3) An historian has garnered international recognition and praise for a book in which she
defends a certain view of how the religious faith of one of America’s “founding fathers”
influenced his politics. While researching her next book, the historian runs across some
heretofore unexamined personal letters of this figure that blatantly contradict her own
account of his theology and its effects on his political thought and behavior. She does not
ignore or suppress the letters, but rather examines them fairly and thoroughly. Because
she is more interested in believing and writing what is true than she is in receiving the
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praise of her colleagues and readers, she repudiates her influential account, both privately
and in print.

In each of these scenarios, reaching the truth is not simply or even primarily a matter of
having good eyesight, a good memory, or making valid logical inferences. Rather, the
individuals in question reach the truth because they manifest certain inner attitudes or character
traits. These traits seem to account most saliently for or to best explain why the individuals get to
the truth. The biologist, for example, discovers why the relevant bird species has altered its
migratory course on account of his patient, focused inquiry and his refined powers of observation
and discrimination. The reporter uncovers a corporate scandal because he is intellectually
courageous and autonomous. And the historian accepts and acknowledges a major error in her
work because of her intellectual openness, humility, and general love of truth.
Therefore intellectual character virtues do sometimes satisfy the virtue reliabilist’s
conditions for an intellectual virtue: with regard to certain propositions or situations, intellectual
character virtues can play a critical or salient role in getting a person to the truth.19 These are
cases in which reaching the truth requires more than the routine operation of a person’s basic
cognitive endowment – cases that make significant demands on a person qua agent. Moreover,
they often are cases in which something very important is at stake, for instance, knowledge of
important historical events and realities, the complex operation and structure of the natural
world, the just or unjust treatment of a particular person or group of people, etc. It follows that

19

Robert Roberts and Jay Wood draw a similar connection between intellectual character virtues and Alvin
Plantinga’s reliabilist or quasi-reliabilist epistemology in “Proper Function, Emotion, and Virtues of the Intellect,”
Faith and Philosophy, 21 (2004), pp. 3-24. One important difference between their discussion and the present one,
however, is that they say little about how exactly a reliabilist might make use of or incorporate the insight that
character virtues often are crucial to an agent’s reliability or proper function.
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virtue reliabilists’ inattention to the domain of intellectual character leaves them unable to
adequately account for some of the most important kinds or instances of knowledge.
It is important to note that while virtue reliabilists have generally avoided discussions of
intellectual character in their treatment of intellectual virtue, they have (apparently without
realizing it) not done so in their discussions of intellectual vice. Given the qualities that
reliabilists identify as intellectual virtues, one would expect that when discussing intellectual
vices, their concern would be things like a deteriorating memory, far-sightedness, hardness of
hearing, etc. But this is not what one typically finds. Goldman, for example, cites guesswork,
wishful thinking, and ignoring contrary evidence as paradigm intellectual vices.20 Sosa cites
haste and inattentiveness.21 And Greco cites wishful thinking and superstition.22 Virtue
reliabilists are right, even by their own standards, to identify these qualities as intellectual vices,
since they significantly hinder a person’s ability to reach the truth. But the qualities in question
generally are not a result of defective cognitive faculties or abilities of the sort that usually
interest the reliabilist. Rather, they are more accurately described as states or manifestations of
vicious intellectual character.
This adds to the surprise that virtue reliabilists have not given significant attention to
virtues of intellectual character, for these qualities are the virtuous counterparts to the qualities
they identify as intellectual vices. It is as though virtue reliabilists have recognized that certain
traits of intellectual character tend systematically to block access to the truth (and hence are
intellectual vices) while failing to acknowledge that others play a systematic and salient role in
reaching the truth (and hence are intellectual virtues).

20

Op. cit., p. 162.
Op. cit., p. 229.
22
“Virtue Epistemology,” in Jonathan Dancy and Ernest Sosa (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Epistemology
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), p. 520-22, at p. 521.
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Before turning to consider a possible objection to this argument, it is worth pointing out
that its scope is not limited to virtue reliabilism: it has implications for virtually any version of
reliabilism. Consider, for example, a version of reliabilism that makes the doxastic processes or
methods employed by a cognitive agent (rather than any quality of the agent herself) the source
of epistemic justification.23 According to such views, a belief is justified (roughly) just in case it
is produced by a reliable process or method. The intellectual character virtues, in addition to
satisfying the formal conditions of a reliabilist account of intellectual virtue, also satisfy the
conditions for a reliable process or method. This is because forming beliefs via an exercise of
intellectual character virtues involves instantiating certain reliable processes or employing
certain reliable methods that are characteristic or expressive of these virtues (e.g., the processes
or methods involved with fair or careful or tenacious inquiry). And with respect to certain kinds
or cases of knowledge, cognitive performances of this sort are essential to reaching the truth.
Therefore even reliabilists who explain justification in terms other than intellectual virtue must
give a significant epistemological role to the intellectual character virtues if they hope to account
for the full range of human knowledge.
How might a reliabilist or virtue reliabilist try to get around this conclusion? A virtue
reliabilist24 might attempt to make a principled exclusion of intellectual character virtues in
something like the following way.25 Epistemologists like Sosa and Goldman originally
introduced the concept of an intellectual virtue into the epistemological discussion in an effort to
explain what distinguishes instances of knowledge from instances of mere true belief. The
See, e.g., Goldman, “What is Justified Belief?” in George Pappas (ed.), Justification and Knowledge (Boston: D.
Reidel, 1981), pp. 1-25.
24
For ease of discussion, I will focus on a version of the objection couched in virtue reliabilist terms. However, an
analogous point could easily be raised from the standpoint of other forms of reliabilism as well. My reply is
applicable to either version of the objection.
25
This objection was presented to me by Stephen Grimm in his comments on an earlier draft of this paper at the
2004 Inland Northwest Philosophy Conference.
23
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difference, they argued, has to do with the source or origin of the beliefs in question. A true
belief counts as knowledge only if its source is reliable; and an intellectual virtue is a reliable
source of belief. Thus for virtue reliabilists, the class of intellectual virtues is limited to certain
reliable sources of belief. Intellectual character virtues like open-mindedness, intellectual
tenacity, and carefulness, however, would not appear to be sources of belief – at least not in the
same way that cognitive faculties like introspection and vision are sources of belief. Therefore,
the objection goes, there are principled grounds for excluding the intellectual character virtues
from a reliabilist account of knowledge.
But is it right to think that character virtues are not “sources” of belief in the sense
relevant to virtue reliabilism? This depends of course on what the reliabilist has in mind or ought
to have in mind by this notion. On a broad construal, something is a source of a belief just in case
it is the cause or salient cause of that belief. This would seem to be the conception most relevant
to any version of reliabilism, since reliabilists often define knowledge as (roughly) true belief
caused by an intellectual virtue or other mechanism. Goldman, for instance, says: “According to
reliabilism, the epistemic status of a belief depends on its mode of causation.”26 But on this broad
conception of what it is to be a source of belief, intellectual character virtues are sources of
belief. As explained above, intellectual character virtues are sometimes the cause or salient cause
of a person’s reaching the truth.
For the objection in question to have any force, a narrower conception of a “source” of
belief must be assumed. According to one such conception, something is a source of belief just in
case it generates beliefs independently of other beliefs or generates them in an immediate or
“Reliabilism,” in Edward Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/P044SECT1), sec. 1, par. 7. The notion of causation would also seem to unify
or explain several other common ways of stating the reliabilist’s central claim: for instance, that knowledge is true
belief arrived at “by way of,” “through,” “as a result of,” etc., an exercise of intellectual virtues; or that it is true
belief “produced by,” “generated by,” “with its source in,” etc., intellectual virtues.
26

14

noninferential way. This conception coheres well with many of the traits that virtue reliabilists
regard as intellectual virtues, for example, introspection, intuitive reason, and the various sensory
faculties. Moreover, it succeeds at excluding intellectual character virtues, since these traits do
not give rise to or generate beliefs in the immediate or noninferential way typical of many faculty
virtues. If this conception of a source of belief can reasonably be attributed to virtue reliabilists,
it would appear to yield a principled objection to the foregoing argument.
But there are good reasons for thinking that virtue reliabilists do not and should not
accept this conception. First, it rules out some of the traits that virtually all reliabilists regard as
intellectual virtues. As noted above, reliabilists commonly cite certain “approved ways of
reasoning” like inductive and explanatory reasoning as paradigm cases of intellectual virtue.
While these forms of reasoning count as sources of belief in the broad sense noted above, they
are not sources of belief in the present, narrower sense. Indeed they are methods of inference, of
drawing certain conclusions on the basis of other claims or beliefs; they do not generate beliefs
in an immediate or noninferential way. Sosa himself draws a distinction along these lines
between “generation” faculties and “transmission” faculties, both of which he regards as
intellectual virtues. He comments: “There are faculties of two broad sorts: those that lead to
beliefs from beliefs already formed, and those that lead to beliefs but not from beliefs. The first
of these we call ‘transmission’ faculties, the second ‘generation’ faculties.”27 Sosa cites intuitive
reason, perception, and introspection as examples of generation faculties; he cites deductive,
inductive, and explanatory reasoning as examples of transmission faculties. Thus virtue
reliabilists do not limit the class of intellectual virtues to those faculties that generate beliefs in
an immediate or noninferential way.

Sosa, op. cit., p. 225. Sosa draws a similar distinction between “fundamental” and “derived” faculties or virtues
(p. 278).
27
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Second, virtue reliabilists are right not to employ this narrower conception of what counts
as a source of belief. For if a virtue reliabilist were to limit the class of intellectual virtues to
those cognitive faculties that qualify as sources of belief in this sense, the scope of knowledge
would be limited to immediate knowledge, e.g., knowledge of (perhaps just the appearance of)
one’s immediate surroundings, direct intuitive or a priori knowledge, introspective knowledge,
etc. Inferential knowledge, the kind of knowledge we (seem to) acquire from various reliable
ways or methods of reasoning, would be impossible. Thus to avoid a form of radical skepticism,
virtue reliabilists must reject this narrower conception of what counts as a source of belief.
Is there perhaps a less restrictive understanding of what it is to be a source of belief that
would exclude intellectual character virtues while including the full range of reliabilist faculty
virtues? This is highly unlikely, for as I turn now to consider, close inspection reveals that
character virtues and faculty virtues are in a certain sense inseparable. This is because an
exercise of character virtues is sometimes (perhaps always) manifested in and partly constituted
by an operation of certain faculty virtues.
This is most evident in connection with some of the reliable methods or forms of
reasoning just discussed. Note first that these methods are more accurately described as forms of
intellectual activity than as mere default modes of cognitive functioning. There typically is a
more active dimension to inductive or deductive reasoning, for instance, than there is to the
routine operation of one’s sensory faculties. Given that exercising a character virtue also usually
involves engaging in a certain kind of intellectual activity, it should not be surprising that these
forms of reasoning might intersect or overlap with intellectual character virtues. Recall the
historian who, out of open-mindedness, intellectual humility, and a genuine commitment to the
truth, encounters and accepts data that undermines her acclaimed scholarly work. How exactly
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should we understand the connection between her acts of reasoning and her exercise of various
character virtues? One reply is that her intellectual openness and commitment to the truth enable
her to continue investigating (rather than to bury) the relevant data once she realizes that it
threatens her position. While this much is correct, the traits in question might also lead her to
think through the data in reasonable (rather than sloppy and defensive) ways or to draw valid
conclusions from it (rather than to distort its implications). Her open-mindedness, for instance,
might cause her to avoid committing a certain logical fallacy that most others in her situation
would commit or to perceive an otherwise easily missed logical connection. Here, a sharp
distinction cannot be drawn between the historian’s reasoning and her exercise of various
character virtues. It is not as though she displays open-mindedness and subsequently reasons in
the ways in question. Rather, her exercise of open-mindedness is partly constituted by her acts of
reasoning.
This relation between intellectual character virtues and standard reliabilist virtues is not
limited to methods or acts of reasoning. It can also extend to the functioning of basic cognitive
faculties like vision. We noted, for instance, that the field biologist discussed above reaches the
truth about a change in migration patterns on account of his intellectual carefulness, concern with
detail, and other intellectual character virtues. This might involve the following. As the biologist
studies the birds’ new winter habitat, he notices or sees certain subtle but critical geographical
details that would normally go unnoticed. His exercise of certain character virtues in this case is
partly constituted by the operation of his visual faculty: his inquiring in a careful and attentive
way just is (or mostly is) a matter of making certain visual observations.
The tight logical connection between character virtues and faculty virtues is also evident
in the fact that when epistemologists seek to offer detailed characterizations of the latter, they
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have a hard time avoiding talk of the former. Sosa, for instance, in a discussion regarding the
fallibility of faculty virtues, notes that the reliability of one’s cognitive faculties can be affected
by one’s intellectual conduct. Interestingly, the conduct he proceeds to describe is precisely that
of certain intellectual character virtues and vices. He says that “[t]hrough greater attentiveness
and circumspection one can normally improve the quality of one’s introspection and thus
enhance its accuracy.”28 He also remarks that the process of forming beliefs through
introspection “can of course go wrong in various ways,” for example, through an exercise of
“haste” or “inattentiveness.”29 Sosa concludes that “a belief’s justification derives from the
endowments and conduct that lie behind it.”30mA second example is Sosa’s discussion of
“ampliative” or “coherence-seeking” reason, which he describes as a subfaculty of reason proper
which incorporates nondeductive methods of reasoning including inductive and explanatory
reasoning. While at times Sosa describes this trait as a kind of default cognitive mode (thereby
suggesting parity with other faculty virtues like vision or memory), at other times he describes it
in more active and psychologically richer terms. He refers to it, for instance, as “reason as we
know it, with its thirst for comprehensive coherence,” as “an inner drive for greater and greater
explanatory comprehensiveness,” and as “a rational drive for coherence.”31 Here coherenceseeking reason seems less like a natural or default cognitive mode than it does a cultivated
excellence of intellectual character.32
It is clear, then, that the kind of fundamental and categorical distinction between
character virtues and faculty virtues central to the objection above is unwarranted. Again, an
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exercise of character virtues is often manifested in and partly constituted by the operation of
certain faculty virtues. Moreover, as the passages from Sosa indicate, the reliability of faculty
virtues often implicates one or more character virtues. Therefore the attempt to make a principled
exclusion of character virtues from the reliabilist repertoire of intellectual virtues on the grounds
that faculty virtues but not character virtues are “sources” of belief seems bound to fail.
III
Thus far I have mainly been concerned with showing (1) that virtue reliabilists tend to
neglect matters of intellectual character and (2) that because intellectual character virtues
sometimes satisfy virtue reliabilists’ formal conditions for an intellectual virtue, this neglect is
unwarranted. We have seen that as a result, virtue reliabilists (and reliabilists in general) must
add the character virtues to their repertoire of intellectual virtues (or alternative justificationconferring qualities). But what additional implications, if any, does the argument have?
One implication, which resembles a claim sometimes made by virtue ethicists, concerns
the general scope or orientation of virtue reliabilism.33 Virtue ethicists often claim that modern
ethical theories tend mistakenly to neglect or ignore the person in their accounts of the moral life
and that a return to the notion of virtue in moral philosophy offers a way of correcting this
problem.34 A similar point could be made about virtue reliabilism. We have seen that virtue
reliabilists tend to characterize knowers in highly mechanistic and impersonal terms. This is
evident in their tendency, noted above, to describe intellectual virtues as “truth-conducive beliefforming mechanism[s]” or as “input-output devices” and to liken knowers to thermometers,
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thermostats, and the like.35 This is true even of Greco’s “agent reliabilist” approach to
epistemology, which stresses the natural cognitive faculties and abilities of knowers rather than
their actual agency.36 We have also seen, however, that this limited focus yields an incomplete
account of epistemic reliability, for epistemic reliability is a function, not just of one’s basic
cognitive functioning, but also of one’s cognitive character. Therefore one lesson to be drawn is
that virtue reliabilism must expand its focus to include the character of epistemic agents or the
epistemic agent qua agent.
A related implication concerns the general structure of virtue epistemology. We noted
early on that standard characterizations of virtue epistemology divide the field into two main
camps: virtue reliabilism and virtue responsibilism. And the impression one gets from the
literature is that the division between the two camps runs deep: virtue reliabilists are said to limit
their focus to cognitive faculties and related abilities while virtue responsibilists limit their
attention to matters of intellectual character. But in light of the fact that virtue reliabilists must
expand their focus to include the epistemic agent qua agent, it is obvious that this way of carving
up the field will not do. This does not entail that any distinction between virtue reliabilism and
virtue responsibilism must be abandoned. But it does mean that we shall be forced to rethink the
relation between the two approaches and to that extent the overall structure of the field of virtue
epistemology.
But the argument also has certain theoretical implications for virtue reliabilism. We can
begin to see what these are by noting, first, that an important requirement of any fully adequate
reliabilist epistemology is to give an account of the reliability of the processes or traits that it
regards as contributing to knowledge. Sosa and others have shed a great deal of ink developing
35
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such an account for faculty virtues. However, as I turn now to argue, character virtues are
structurally different from faculty virtues such that existing models of reliability seem
inapplicable to character virtues in important ways. The result, we will see, is that a certain
amount of theoretical work must be done by virtue reliabilists before they can offer an adequate
account of the reliability of character virtues.
Two related differences between faculty virtues and character virtues concern the
conditionality or relativity of their reliability. Reliabilists often point out that the reliability of
faculty virtues is not unconditional; rather, it is relative to certain kinds of truths or to certain
“propositional fields” as well as to certain environmental conditions.37 I will discuss each of
these parameters in turn.
Consider the faculty of hearing. Clearly this faculty is reliable with respect to certain
kinds of propositions (e.g., those concerning the sound or spatial location of nearby objects) but
not with respect to others (e.g., those concerning the color, shape, or the scent of things). In the
case of faculty virtues like hearing, it is reasonably easy to arrive at a plausible specification of
the relevant propositional fields. A propositional field can be specified or at least substantially
narrowed in such cases simply on the basis of the content of the propositions in question:
propositions about the color and the shape of things, for example, are epistemically “relevant” to
the faculty of vision but not to the auditory or olfactory faculties since the former but not the
latter is helpful for reaching the truth about the subject matter in question. The fairly obvious and
natural correspondence between particular faculty virtues and particular fields of propositions is
also evident in the fact that it makes good sense to speak of “visual propositions,” “introspective
propositions,” “a priori propositions,” “memorial propositions,” and the like.
37
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But character virtues are fundamentally different from faculty virtues in this respect. We
noted earlier that at a certain level, it is clear that character virtues are critical for reaching the
truth with regard to certain subject matters but not others. For instance, while not essential to
reaching the truth about, say, the general appearance of one’s immediate surroundings, an
exercise of character virtues is essential to the acquisition of much “higher grade” knowledge
(e.g., scientific, philosophical, or historical knowledge). Notice, however, that the
correspondence here between character virtues and certain propositional fields is extremely
general. It fails to tell us anything about the propositional fields relevant to any particular
character virtues.
The problem is that it is difficult and perhaps impossible to provide this kind of narrower
specification for individual character virtues. This is due to certain uniquely “situational” aspects
of these traits. We generally cannot tell just by considering the content of a particular
proposition, for example, which (if any) character virtue is likely to be helpful for reaching the
truth about it. Instead, the applicability of a character virtue to a particular proposition or field of
propositions usually depends in a very deep way on highly contingent features of the person or
situation in question. The virtues of intellectual caution and carefulness, for instance, might be
required in one situation to reach the truth about a proposition which in another situation could
be known only via an exercise of intellectual courage and perseverance.38 In contrast with faculty
virtues, the relevance of a character virtue to a particular field of propositions is not given by the
content of the propositions themselves. This is reflected in the fact that it makes little sense to
speak of “intellectual courage propositions,” “fair-mindedness propositions,” etc. Again, the kind
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of subject matter with respect to which intellectual courage or fair-mindedness are likely to be
reliable is a deeply contingent and variable matter.
It follows that a number of questions must be addressed if we are to have an adequate
grasp of the reliability of character virtues: Is the reliability of (individual) character virtues
“field-relative” at all? If so, how are these fields determined and what are they? If not, then what
alternative parameter or parameters might be useful for characterizing the reliability of character
virtues? Without answers to these and related questions, our grasp of the reliability of character
virtues is importantly incomplete.
A second and related point concerns the kinds of environmental conditions under which
intellectual character virtues are reliable. As noted above, reliabilists like Sosa regularly point
out that any given faculty virtue will be reliable relative to certain environments but not others.
Vision, for instance, is reliable in good lighting and in “normal” environments, but not in
complete darkness, a funhouse, or a smoke-filled room. Similarly, hearing is reliable only where
there is a not a lot of background noise, where one is not submerged in water, and so forth. These
examples indicate that the environmental conditions relevant to a particular faculty virtue
typically can be specified by reference to the faculty’s natural or proper function: a faculty is
reliable only with respect to environmental conditions that permit or do not obstruct or interfere
with such functioning.
The reliability of character virtues is also relative to certain environmental conditions.
Open-mindedness or intellectual courage, for example, can do more cognitive harm than good if
exercised in the wrong situation. Yet the environmental conditions relevant to the proper
functioning of character virtues would seem to be categorically different from those relevant to
faculty virtues. This can be seen in the fact that character virtues often are helpful for reaching
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the truth in the face of the very sorts of environmental conditions that tend to interfere with the
performance of faculty virtues.
We can begin to see how by noting that it does not seem quite right to think of the
reliability of character virtues like intellectual perseverance or keen attentiveness as relative to
environments with good lighting, little background noise, few distractions, etc. It is not that these
virtues are unreliable with respect such environments; it is just that their exercise is often
unnecessary. For these are situations in which a person often can reach the truth just by virtue of
the proper functioning of his basic cognitive faculties. To know that there is a substantial plot of
grass outside my window, for instance, I need not be intellectually perseverant or attentive; I just
need decent vision and a minimal amount of lighting.
Under what conditions, then, do character virtues tend to be reliable? These traits are
especially helpful for reaching the truth where the truth is hard to come by. And often what
makes the truth hard to come by are precisely the environmental or situational factors that can
undermine or interfere with the reliability of faculty virtues: a gap between appearance and
reality, untrustworthy interlocutors, incomplete or misleading evidence, and the like. What this
shows is that character virtues are reliable with respect to very different sorts of environmental
conditions when compared with faculty virtues. In fact, in a certain sense, the situational
relevance of character virtues picks up where that of many faculty virtues leaves off. Therefore,
to arrive at an illuminating account of the reliability of character virtues, we also must attempt to
clarify the sorts of environmental conditions under which they are reliable.
A third issue related to the reliability of character virtues concerns the tighter “unity” of
these virtues when compared with faculty virtues. Unlike faculty virtues, character virtues
typically are reliable only when possessed in conjunction with other character virtues. Open-
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mindedness, intellectual caution, or intellectual tenacity, for example, are unlikely to be very
helpful for reaching the truth if possessed in isolation: open-mindedness typically must be
tempered by a kind of mindfulness and adherence to arguments and evidence, intellectual caution
by a firm commitment to discovering the truth, and intellectual tenacity by a willingness to revise
a belief or course of inquiry if the evidence finally calls for it. Similarly, the genuine possession
of a single character virtue often seems to presuppose the possession of others virtues. It would
seem, for example, that to be genuinely intellectually fair, one must also be intellectually careful
and patient, which in turn would seem to require that one be intellectually attentive and
determined.
This deep interconnectedness among character virtues generates additional questions that
must be addressed if we are to have a proper grasp of the reliability of these traits. For instance,
to what extent and in what way are the character virtues unified? Does the possession of a single
intellectual character virtue entail the possession of all the others? If not, which subsets of
character virtues “go together”? And how exactly are these virtues related to each other such that
when (but only when) taken together they are reliable? Finally, if the relevant traits are reliable
only when possessed in conjunction with other such traits, in what sense are they, when
considered individually, really intellectual virtues at all? Would it not be more appropriate to
think of the relevant clusters of traits as intellectual virtues – or perhaps (given a strong unity
thesis) only the entire set of traits?
For ease of discussion, I shall continue to describe the individual traits themselves as
intellectual virtues. A fourth challenge posed by the foregoing argument concerns the application
of virtue reliabilism (and reliabilism in general – see below) to particular beliefs. To explain the
justification of a particular belief formed by one or more character virtues, the virtue reliabilist

25

must provide a characterization of these virtues according to which they are clearly reliable. And
as we saw above, this characterization must be reasonably specific. (Again, if the
characterization is too general, the reliability of the traits will appear questionable.) When
providing this kind of specification of faculty virtues, virtue reliabilists appeal to certain logical
parameters like the propositional field and environmental conditions relevant to the faculty in
question. (Vision, for instance, can be characterized as reliable with respect to claims about
appearances and when operating at close range in normal well-lit environments.) We have seen,
however, that it is far from clear how or whether these parameters apply to the reliability of
character virtues. Thus until further light is shed on how best to understand and characterize the
reliability of character virtues, virtue reliabilists’ ability to explain the justification of beliefs
produced by such virtues will be significantly limited.39
This problem is compounded by the apparent “unity” of the intellectual virtues. We saw
above that, unlike the possession of faculty virtues, the possession of a single character virtue
often seems to presuppose that of several others. Because these interrelations among character
virtues are often very complex and difficult to discern, the task of providing a precise and
accurate description of the character virtue or virtues involved in the production of particular
beliefs is more difficult than it might initially appear. To complete this task adequately, we shall
need a better understanding than we presently have of the deep interrelatedness or unity of the
character virtues. And again, absent such an understanding, virtue reliabilists will be unable to
give a full account of the justification of certain beliefs (viz., beliefs produced by character
virtues that are “unified” with other character virtues in the relevant sense).

This problem bears an obvious similarity to the so-called “generality problem” for reliabilism. The challenge here,
however, is not that of choosing in a nonarbitrary way between a variety of applicable characterizations of the
relevant faculty or process, but rather that of identifying just a single applicable characterization.
39
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It is worth pausing again to note that the theoretical questions and problems identified in
this section are relevant, not just to virtue reliabilism, but to any form of reliabilism. Like the
virtue reliabilist, the method or process reliabilist, for instance, also must provide an illuminating
explanation of the reliability of those methods or processes they regard as capable of conferring
justification. Since, as was pointed out earlier, these include the methods or processes
characteristic or expressive of the intellectual character virtues, reliabilists of this stripe also must
reckon with questions about the logical parameters and unity of the character virtues. For again,
in the absence of a better understanding of these matters, they will be unable to account for the
reliability of some of the very methods or processes they deem (or at least should deem) central
to justification. As noted in connection with virtue reliabilism, this is a problem both in its own
right and as it relates to the application of their view to particular beliefs. Therefore, reliabilists
in general must pay greater attention to matters of intellectual character and must address the
theoretical questions and challenges that accompany this shift in focus.40
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